Testimony postponed
Judge María Tardón of the Audiencia Nacional has pushed back the first questioning of Miguel Ángel Pérez Triano, the former government delegate in Ceuta, as a formal suspect (investigado) in the probe into the mass entry of people into Ceuta at the end of July. Europa Press, citing legal sources, reported that the hearing was moved to 1 December. El País reported that the judge set it for 30 November at 10.00, after Pérez Triano asked for a delay because he had not yet been able to read the complaints (querellas) filed against him. The two dates conflict, and this cluster does not settle which one is correct. The hearing had been set for Wednesday, 18 November.
Pérez Triano resigned in September 2026, saying he had decided to leave some time earlier and had told the minister Ángel Víctor Torres, who was coordinating the Ceuta crisis. He left politics, he said, because his family 'does not deserve this pressure'. Tardón named him a suspect after hearing from his former chief of staff, Gonzalo Sanz, in early October. Sanz told the court that intelligence services had warned of a possible mass entry and that he had passed the warning on to his boss. Pérez Triano has insisted for weeks that he never received such information.
The inquiry first focused on possible Moroccan involvement in an irregular entry of more than 80,000 people. The judge cited indications of a coordinated and intentional offence 'presumably committed abroad' that 'seriously attacked the territorial integrity of Spain', and she also examined all actions taken on Spanish soil, including the handling of alerts.
- Mass entry into Ceuta organised through social media, which police date to 30 and 31 July
- Miguel Ángel Pérez Triano resigns as Ceuta government delegate
- Former chief of staff Gonzalo Sanz testifies before the judge
- Judge postpones Pérez Triano's testimony as a suspect
Minors in Ceuta's reception centres
The Ceuta government wants all 3,767 minors registered in the city returned to Morocco. They are spread across 23 reception centres, 13 of which opened on 1 August, with the most recent opened over the weekend before Tuesday's press conference. Its spokesman, Alejandro Ramírez of the PP, said the number of minors meant overcrowding of 12,900% and a load 130 times the region's ordinary reception capacity. He said the request rests on the fact that the situation is unsustainable.
Ramírez complained that the returns had not begun, saying:
The worst of all is that not a single return to Morocco has taken place.
He added that Morocco had itself asked for all the minors to be sent back, but that only about 300 files had been forwarded and Rabat had answered none of them. He said that ministers still describe relations with the neighbour as very good, a stance he found puzzling.
Police report on Moroccan security links
The National Police's immigration and border centre, CENIF, has sent the Audiencia Nacional a new report claiming up to 97 connections between members of Moroccan security forces and the digital groups that organised the mass entry on 30 and 31 July through social media. Investigators reviewed the contacts of 19 administrators and 32 facilitators of WhatsApp groups identified in an earlier technical report sent in August. In 49 cases, the report says, they obtained information about the possible personal identity of members of Moroccan security and intelligence structures. The data were checked against open sources, including a database from the hacktivist group Jabaroot, which the report describes as having previously claimed and verified cyberattacks against Moroccan institutions and as the author of a mass data leak in August 2026. The police say the links do not point to a single police force or territorial level, and span units from the General Directorate of National Security, the intelligence services, the Royal Gendarmerie and staff guarding royal palaces.
Competing explanations
According to La Razón, citing El Faro de Ceuta, Guardia Civil and CNI reports sent to Tardón reject comparing the July episode directly with the May 2021 crisis, when Morocco used migration pressure amid a diplomatic dispute with Spain. The CNI attributes the 2026 events to a mix of factors: calls for mass entry spread on social media, economic pressure in some sectors of Moroccan society, and what it calls 'permissiveness and failure' at the border by Moroccan authorities. El País reported on Monday that the intelligence service's conclusions do not, for now, link the entry to coordinated action by the Moroccan state, because no evidence has been obtained to support that. This clashes with the view held by the CENIF.
The Guardia Civil considers up to five hypotheses. The first, which investigators regard as the most serious but also the least likely, is that Morocco used migration as pressure on Spain after certain diplomatic moves in the region. Agents say that theory loses force because Rabat issued no hostile institutional statements against Spain in the days before the crisis. The second holds that police surveillance was deliberately relaxed to avoid images of clashes during an important Moroccan celebration.